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Resumen: la filosofía cosmogónica de la Naturaleza que propone Peirce, 
representa una revisión radical de la idea de emergencia, en sustitución de 
la metafísica tradicional mecanicista que era dominante en la ciencia de 
su época, junto con la idea del azar en el mundo como la base o funda-
mento del orden general de la Naturaleza. El resultado es una nueva y po-
tencialmente revolucionaria consideración de la evolución emergente que 
tiene en cuenta las condiciones mecánicas y la conformidad general a la ley 
como condiciones emergentes que surgen a través de procesos evolutivos 
operando a una escala cosmológica. Fundamentar la cosmogonía evolutiva 
en la idea de azar en la filosofía de la Naturaleza de Peirce representa un 
radical e importante punto de partida para gran parte de la tradición emer-
gentista. Más aún, ofrece las bases para una teoría general de la emergencia 
que podría considerar los fenómenos emergentes como una parte general-
mente predecible y explicable del orden general de la naturaleza como tal.
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Abstract: Peirce’s cosmogonic philosophy of Nature represents a radical 
rethinking of the idea of emergence, replacing the traditional metaphysics 
of mechanism that was dominant within the science of the day with the 
idea of a chance world as the base or grounding condition of the general 
order of Nature. The result is a novel and potentially revolutionary ac-
count of emergent evolution that sees both the conditions of mechanism 
and generalized conformity to law as emergent conditions that come into 
being through evolutionary processes operating at a cosmological scale. By 
grounding evolutionary cosmogony in the idea of chance Peirce’s philos-
ophy of Nature represents a radical and important departure from much 
of the emergentist tradition. Most importantly, it offers the groundwork 
for a general theory of emergence that would see emergent phenomena as 
generally predictable and explicable part of the general order of Nature as 
such.
Keywords: chance, cosmogony, emergence, evolution, law, mechanism, 
Nature, Peirce.
§1. IntroductIon
One of the earliest proponents of the idea of emergent evolution in its strong 
ontological sense is C.S. Peirce. Peirce was among the first to extend the general 
principles of evolution to an ontological level, taking both the spontaneity of 
chance and a general principle of growth to be real, irreducible ingredients of the 
general order of Nature. So radical and extensive was Peirce’s emergentist philos-
ophy that he proposed that the laws of Nature themselves should be viewed, not 
as eternally given conditions, but as emergent conditions that have come into 
being through evolutionary processes on a cosmological scale. Driven by the 
call to explain, Peirce’s “Cosmogonic Philosophy” (Peirce, 1891: 297) pushed 
the principles of evolutionary explanation to their logical and ontological limits, 
making him among the first of the early emergentist philosophers to develop 
what amounts to a general theory of emergence, an attempt to explain or provide a 
reasonable account of emergence in general as an explicable fact of Nature. 
Emergent evolution in its broadest, most general sense is the idea that evolu-
tionary processes can give rise to new or novel conditions that are not reducible 
to the conditions from which they arise. Recent accounts of emergent evolution 
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are often seen as having their roots in the so-called ‘British emergentists’ of the 
early part of the 20th century, most notably: Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, 
and C.D. Broad. So strong is the association between contemporary theories of 
emergence and the British ‘school’ that Jaegwon Kim has proposed that con-
temporary accounts of emergence should be framed in a way that is continuous 
with the “conceptual and doctrinal convergence” that is characteristic of the early 
British “movement” (Kim, 2006: 548). According to Kim, a central feature of 
the British emergentists, at least as expressed in the work of Broad, is the idea 
that emergent conditions are not reducible to their base, which is often taken 
to be mechanistic in character (1996: 551-552). Broad and others generally as-
sumed that the order of Nature was mechanistic at its base and since some phe-
nomena did not seem to be readily amenable to mechanistic explanations, they 
were re-characterized as emergent in some sense.
It is here that Peirce’s account of emergent evolution differs so radically from 
most within the tradition, for Peirce rejects the mechanistic metaphysics against 
which emergentism develops and proposes a radically new ontological system 
whose base condition is not mechanism per se but tychasm or chance. Focusing 
on the work produced during Peirce’s so-called ‘Monist’ period, we will see that 
Peirce’s attempt to explain the origins of the laws of nature is in fact the ground-
work for what amounts to a theory of emergent evolution1. Much of the discussion 
will revolve around the cosmogonic hypothesis outlined in Peirce’s unpublished 
work, “A Guess at the Riddle,” for it is here that the kernel of his cosmogonic 
philosophy is most clearly articulated and laid out. Once Peirce’s cosmogonic 
hypothesis has been made clear I will end by outlining my own speculative meta-
physical account of how the Categories themselves might have come about, with 
Thirdness and Secondness standing in an emergent relation to Firstness. 
§2. PeIrce’s rIddle
One of the earliest and perhaps most systematic outlines of Peirce’s cosmo-
gonic philosophy can be seen in his unpublished but seminal work, “A Guess at 
1 For more on the evolutionary character of Peirce’s philosophy but with a different emphasis see 
Hausman (1997).
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the Riddle.” The principal aim of Peirce’s ‘Guess’ is to illustrate the applicability 
and “continual exemplification” of the Categories –Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness– across a wide range of subject matters from psychology and biolo-
gy, to physics, metaphysics, and theology (Peirce, 1887-1888: 245-246; Peirce, 
1887-1888: 252-253). While Peirce’s various illustrations of the Categories are 
revealing, it is in their application in physics that the boldness and ontological 
reach of his proposal is most fully displayed. It is there that Peirce provides what 
is perhaps his most comprehensive sketch of an evolutionary cosmology or, bet-
ter, cosmogony that purports to account for the origin and development of the 
laws of Nature. For his radical hypothesis to be viable, Peirce must show that 
the emergence of the laws of nature can be accounted for solely by appeal to the 
Categories, as sufficient conditions for the emergence of such laws.
Before outlining the principles underlying the ‘Guess’ we should first make 
clear the nature of Peirce’s riddle. We find clues as to the nature of Peirce’s riddle 
in his earlier work of 1878, “The Order of Nature.” Peirce begins by making 
the following bold and seemingly arbitrary claim: “If a remarkable and universal 
orderliness be found in the universe, there must be some cause for this regularity, 
and science has to consider what hypotheses might account for the phenome-
non” (Peirce, 1878: 170). He follows a little later with the following:
If we could find out any general characteristics of the universe, any mannerism 
in the ways of Nature, any law everywhere applicable and universally valid, such 
a discovery would be of such singular assistance to us in all our future reasoning 
that it would deserve a place almost at the head of the principles of logic. On the 
other hand, if it can be shown that there is nothing of the sort to find out, but 
that every discoverable regularity is of limited range, this again will be of logical 
importance. What sort of conception we ought to have of the universe, and how 
to think of the ensemble of things, is a fundamental problem in the theory of 
reasoning (Peirce, 1878: 171).
There are two questions that stand out as of primary concern here: 1) How 
is the universe ordered? 2) What implications might this have for logic and the 
general theory of reasoning? Later in the same article Peirce repeats this point 
when he notes that “Some important questions of logic depend upon whether 
we are to consider the material universe as of limited extent and finite age, or 
quite boundless in space and time” (Peirce, 1878: 182). If the universe is bound-
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less then any attempt to discern a design embracing the “whole is futile, and 
involves a false way of looking at the subject.” But, continues Peirce, “if there 
was a time before which absolutely no matter existed, if there are certain absolute 
bounds to the region of things outside of which there is a mere void, then we 
naturally seek an explanation of it” (Peirce, 1878: 182). 
Closely related to this line of inquiry is what Peirce sometimes refers to as 
the call to explain, a call that seems part and parcel of our nature as rational, 
logical animals and that is made more puzzling by the fact that our minds appear 
“strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world” (Peirce, 1878: 181). From 
this we can now add a third fundamental question: 3) Why does mind appear 
so readily attuned to the order of Nature?2 Peirce’s riddle is bound up with these 
three questions and he spends a great deal of his work trying to address them in 
one manner or another. The call for explanation is central to the riddle for it is a 
call (or calling) that issues both externally and internally as two sides of the same 
coin, as it were: externally from our experience of phenomena, and internally 
from our character as inquisitive, logical animals who desire by nature to know 
(Rose, 2012).
A central feature of Peirce’s ‘Guess’ at the riddle is his claim that there is some-
thing about the way the universe is ordered that calls for an explanation. To get 
at the heart of Peirce’s account we must first see what it is about the universe that 
calls for an explanation and why.
§3. Why the laWfulness of nature calls for an exPlanatIon
In his 1884 lecture called “Design and Chance” Peirce notes that scientif-
ic justification is always historically situated, and what we may be justified in 
accepting or dismissing in one historical context may be open to question or 
2 Peirce entertains the idea that this adaptation might be the result of natural selection, but then 
concludes that while “Such an hypothesis naturally suggests itself, but it must be admitted that it does 
not seem sufficient to account for the extraordinary accuracy with which these conceptions apply to 
the phenomena of Nature, and it is probable that there is some secret here which remains to be dis-
covered.” (Peirce, 1878: 181-182)
128 Philip Rose
SCIO. Revista de Filosofía, n.º 12, Noviembre de 2016, 123-142, ISSN: 1887-9853
merit inquiry in another depending on the evidence and information available. 
Applied to the laws of Nature Peirce then claims 
that at one stage of inquiry it is quite right to insist strongly on the exactitude of 
established laws, to question which would only lead to confusion, while at a later 
stage it is proper to question the exactitude of those same laws when we are in 
possession of a guiding idea which shows us in what manner they may possibly 
be corrected (Peirce, 1883-1884: 216).
For Peirce the newly enervated principles of evolutionary explanation com-
bined with the development of non-Euclidean geometries and other mathemat-
ical discoveries at the time justified calling into question the exactitude of es-
tablished laws of Nature. Since, claimed Peirce, there are no good or sufficient 
reasons to suppose that phenomena conform exactly to any specific law (but 
may conform instead in a more general or stochastic manner), then we need to 
provide an account of how phenomena may conform to law in a general rather 
than an exact manner. 
Satisfied that there is indeed sufficient justification for questioning the exac-
titude of the laws of Nature Peirce then goes on to claim that the very existence 
of lawfulness or orderliness in Nature now calls for an explanation: “Among the 
things that demand explanation, then, are the laws of physics; and not this law 
or that law only but every single law.” Further down in the same discussion he 
adds: “But I maintain that the postulate that things shall be explicable extends 
itself to laws as well as to states of things. We want a theory of the evolution of 
physical law” (Peirce, 1883-84: 218). Peirce repeats the same call later in his 
‘Guess,’ stating that “Among other regular facts that have to be explained is Law 
or regularity itself ” (Peirce, 1887-88: 276). While it is clear that Peirce thinks 
that the existence of lawfulness or regularity is something that we are obligated 
to try to explain, it is still not clear what exactly it is about such phenomena that 
calls for an explanation in the first place. Peirce himself says that it is the general 
character of such phenomena that calls for explanation, but never explicitly states 
why this is so. To answer this we must look at what Peirce says about the nature 
of inquiry and the call for explanation.
For Peirce, the call to explain arises when we experience something unantic-
ipated, unexpected, or improbable (given some set of background conditions) 
(Peirce, 1901: 89-95). Such unanticipated or surprising experiences arouse our 
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attention and prompt inquiry (Peirce, 1868: 46-47). Peirce had already noted that 
any “remarkable and universal orderliness” encountered in the universe would 
call for an explanation, and he reiterates the same point with greater emphasis 
in “A Guess at the Riddle,” noting again that “every fact of a general or orderly 
nature calls for an explanation (Peirce, 1887-1888: 276-277). Since any and all 
facts of a general or orderly nature call for explanation, there must be something 
about such phenomena that is unexpected, surprising or “remarkable” in some 
sense. Peirce says as much, noting that the kind of uniformity of conformity with 
law associated with the laws of nature “is seen to be really a highly exceptional 
phenomenon” that marks it as “more important” than other, more expected phe-
nomena (Peirce, 1887-1888: 276). What is it about facts or a general or orderly 
nature that would make them appear so remarkable and surprising? It is here that 
we must turn to Peirce’s earlier account of what he calls a “chance-world,” for the 
call to explain the orderliness of Nature only makes sense when set against such 
a world as the base condition of the order of Nature in general.
§4. the symmetrIcal order of logIc and the systematIc character  
of a chance-World
To understand the special character of conformity to law, as an unexpected 
general fact of Nature that calls for an explanation, we need to make clear the 
‘normal’ or default condition that serve as the base or ‘expected’ state of affairs. 
The clue to this lies in Peirce’s account of chance and what he calls a “chance 
world.” In “The Order of Nature” Peirce says that a chance world “would be 
one in which there were no laws, the characters of different things being entirely 
independent; so that, should a sample of any kind of objects ever show a prev-
alent character, it could only be by accident, and no general proposition could 
ever be established” (Peirce, 1878: 172). A ‘chance world’ in Peirce’s sense would 
be completely devoid of any regulating or ordering principle with any possible 
occurrence within that world being as equally likely as any other possible occur-
rence. Since every possibility has an equal chance of occurring in such a world 
then nothing, says Peirce, “could be imagined more systematic” than a chance 
world (Peirce, 1878: 173). In such a world, says Peirce, nothing would attract 
our attention or surprise us precisely because everything that happened would 
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happen by chance and so nothing would be unexpected or surprising (Peirce, 
1878: 175-176). Thus if we imagine a roll of the dice in a purely chance world 
we would not be surprised if we rolled a six, followed by a three, followed by a 
two, and this followed by a six, and so on indefinitely. What would surprise us, 
however, is if one number or set of numbers started to occur more regularly than 
some others. Such regularity would lead us to suspect that there was something 
else going on in the world, something that was causing the occurrences to de-
viate from what we would normally expect on a chance roll. If we take the idea 
of a chance world to be the default condition of things, then any occurrences of 
a regular or uniform sort would quickly catch the attention of a curious mind.
Why take chance as the basic, default condition? Two reasons: 1) First, as 
Peirce notes in many places, chance is a characteristic or feature of the Category 
of Firstness and, as first, should be taken as a basic and primary feature of world. 
Thus, if we were to try and reduce the world to its most basic element the most 
plausible alternative would be a world of purely chance occurrences. 2) Second 
and perhaps most surprisingly, Peirce sees a strong affinity between the systematic 
character of a chance world and the regular symmetrical order of logic. One of the 
more surprising and yet potentially important lessons to be learned from Peirce’s 
analysis here is that the order of logic, when not guided by any special leading 
principle learned from experience, tends to conform exactly and precisely to the 
kind of order found within a chance-world. Put crudely, in a chance world the 
frequency and range of actual occurrences seems to conform exactly to what un-
fettered logic would predict. As Peirce himself says, in a chance world “everything 
that can happen by chance, sometime or other will happen by chance” (Peirce, 
1883-1884: 219-220). This amounts to saying that in a chance world everything 
that is logically possible will also be actually possible. As Peirce himself puts it, “in 
a world where there were no uniformities, no logically possible combination of 
characters would be excluded, but every combination would exist in some object” 
(Peirce, 1878: 173). Thus we should take chance as basic because the systematic 
order of chance seems to conform exactly to the symmetrical order of logic.
The next key question, of course, is whether or not the existing or current 
order of Nature is a chance world, and Peirce quickly affirms that it is not. When 
we examine the world we find various levels and kinds of regularities and unifor-
mities that we would not expect to find in a chance world. Put simply, we find 
some possibilities to be more or less likely than others, a situation that Peirce 
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had earlier characterized as the “dissymmetry of Nature.” A central feature of the 
dissymmetry of Nature is that some logical possibilities seem to be excluded from 
the range of actual occurrences within the general order of Nature. Thus, for 
example, of the range of logical possibilities associated with the claim ‘All men 
are mortal,’ in the order of Nature one of those logically symmetrical possibilities 
seems to be excluded from the range of naturally possible occurrences, namely, 
the logically possible state of “immortal men.”
Let us inquire into this: –to say that All men are mortal is the same as to say that 
of the four classes into which we might imagine all things symmetrically divided 
in respect to humanity and mortality; namely, mortal men, immortal men, mor-
tals not men, and immortals not men–I say that of these four classes, to say All 
men are mortal is to say that one, namely immortal men, does not exist. Such a 
proposition therefore establishes a dissymmetry, in nature (Peirce, 1866: 419).
This ‘natural fact’ or ‘truth of Nature’ suggests that the dissymmetrical order 
of Nature is not a chance world, but is a special subset of the more symmetrical 
order of pure logic (which for our purposes can be taken to be loosely equiva-
lent to a chance world), a fact that points to some principle or condition that is 
affecting the range of logically possible occurrences within the order of Nature 
(Rose, 2011). Put differently, the logically dissymmetrical character of ‘natural 
truths’ or ‘natural facts’ suggests that there is a degree or orderliness or uniformity 
within the order of Nature that marks it as importantly different from what we 
would expect in a purely logical or chance world. Why? The answer can be found 
in the nature of uniformity or regularity as such, for “uniformity consists in the 
non-occurrence in Nature of a certain combination of character” (Peirce, 1878: 
172). Put simply, the existence of regularity or uniformity entails the exclusion or 
diminishment of certain possibilities in favour of others. Since this goes against 
the normal symmetry of logic and the systematic character of a chance world, 
then such exclusionary effects must be the result of a special agency or special 
power of determination that is added to the conditions normally associated with 
a chance world3. 
3 In normal physicalist parlance this ‘natural bias’ is accounted for appealing to some set of laws 
as additional determinations of natural occurrences, but since this is the very condition that Peirce 
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Given the perfect logical symmetry of a chance world and the base ontolog-
ical condition of the Natural world, then the existence of such regularities or 
uniformities would catch our attention, for they would point to something that 
is logically special and unexpected as the source of those surprising facts. The 
level of “conformity with law” expressed by the laws of nature thereby call for 
an explanation precisely because they diverge so strongly from what one would 
expect in a purely chance-like, logically symmetrical world. Such law-like phe-
nomena stand out as “highly exceptional phenomenon” whose very exceptional-
ity calls for explanation. What needs to be explained, of course, is just how such 
law-like phenomena could have emerged or come to be from the base condition 
associated with a chance world, and this is what Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle” 
attempts to address.
§5. PeIrce’s guess at the rIddle
Peirce’s ‘Guess’ is part of a larger attempt to address the question of how the 
dissymmetry of Nature could have come about. To accomplish this Peirce appeals 
to his theory of the Categories. Central to Peirce’s account is the radical claim 
that both the conditions of mechanism (which fall under the dyadic Category 
of Secondness) and law-like generality (which fall under the triadic Category of 
Thirdness) are actually emergent conditions that arise from the more basic or base 
condition of chance (or Firstness). As we shall see, while mechanism emerges or 
follows from the more base condition of chance, it is nevertheless not reducible to 
the chance conditions from which it emerges but has a reality and an efficacy of its 
own. The same is true of the generalizing tendency which gives rise to the growth 
of regularity or lawfulness within Nature, for while it emerges from chance (and 
mechanism) as its base condition, it too is not reducible to its base but has a reality 
and efficacy of its own.
We can best understand Peirce’s ‘Guess’ by beginning with some qualifying 
descriptions and explanations of key moves in Peirce’s account. It is noteworthy 
that Peirce presents his cosmogony as the application of his Categories to physics 
is calling into question and trying to explain then appealing to law in this sense would be to beg the 
question.
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rather than metaphysics. Two important implications follow: 1) Peirce’s ‘Guess’ 
is not an account of the origins of being as such, but is instead a hypothesis re-
garding the origin of general regularity within and logical dissymmetry of Nature 
(as a special subset of being in some more extensive and inclusive sense), and 2) 
Peirce’s ‘Guess’ is not an explanation of the origins or grounds of Thirdness as 
such (as a fundamental Category or element of being), but of a special physicalist 
instance or expression of Thirdness, namely, the habit-taking tendency. Regard-
ing the first point, Peirce himself explicitly notes that his ‘Guess’ is not aimed at 
explaining all aspects of phenomena, e.g. the indeterminacy of “pure firstness” or 
the haecceity of “pure secondness,” but is concerned only with the “highly excep-
tional phenomenon” of uniformity or “conformity with law” (Peirce, 1887-1888: 
276). In fact, Peirce goes to great pains to make clear that he is not attempting to 
explain the origins of “pure firstness” and “pure secondness,” arguing that such 
non-general aspects or elements of phenomena are “facts not calling for and not 
capable of explanation” (Peirce, 1887-1888: 275). Regarding the second point, 
I want to suggest that what Peirce calls “habit taking” is but one of a number 
of possible thirds that are or could have been operant across multiple possible 
worlds or “systems.” We see this illustrated in “Design and Chance” where Peirce 
attempts to explain the logic underlying evolutionary selection by asking his 
reader to envisage “a large number of systems in some of which there is a decided 
tendency toward doing again what has once been done, in others a tendency 
against doing what has once been done, in others elements having one tendency 
and elements having the other.” Peirce then goes on to see how each of these 
possible tendencies would play out in a world of chance.
To fix our ideas suppose players playing with dice, some of their dice are worn 
down in such a way that the act of losing tends to make them lose again, others 
in such a way that the act of losing tends to make them win. The latter will win 
or lose much more slowly, yet after sufficient length of time they will eventually 
be ruined or destroyed. Those whose dice are so worn as to reproduce the same 
effects will be divided into two parts, one of which will quickly be destroyed, the 
other made stronger and stronger. For every kind of organism, system, form, or 
compound, there is an absolute limit to a weakening process. It ends in destruc-
tion; there is no limit to strength. The result is that chance in its action tends to 
destroy the weak & increase the average strength of the objects remaining. Sys-
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tems and compounds which have bad habits follow the same course; only those 
that have good habits tend to survive (Peirce, 1883-1884: 223).
The lesson is simple, a habit taking tendency is but one of a multiplicity of 
possible tendencies, and in a world of chance events, a habit taking tendency will 
tend to ‘survive’ or endure because it will produce an accelerated growth in the 
average strength of those with this tendency, allowing the habit taking tendency 
to inevitably supersede any and all elements or systems lacking in a that tendency 
in any way (e.g. systems that have a habit breaking tendency or those that have 
some combination or mixture or the habit taking and habit breaking tendencies, 
and so on). Since the habit taking tendency is but one of a multitude of such 
possible tendencies then it is clear that the habit taking tendency is not Thirdness 
as such, but merely a particular (and cosmologically dominant) third. Of the 
various habit-relating tendencies, the habit-taking tendency would tend to win 
out, as it were, in a process of cosmological selection, a point that will become 
relevant again in answering the question of how that tendency is established in 
Peirce’s ‘Guess’.
Returning once again to the ‘Guess’ Peirce notes that the primary purpose 
of his proposed cosmogony is to explain “how the laws of nature came about” 
(Peirce, 1887-1888: 277). To explain how such “highly exceptional phenomena” 
might have come about Peirce simply proposes a physicalist interpretation of 
his Categories with three basic elements put into play: “first, chance; second, 
law; and third, habit taking” (Peirce, 1887-1888: 277). Chance is the physicalist 
expression of Firstness, law the physicalist expression of Secondness, and habit 
taking the physicalist expression of Thirdness. We will proceed by summarizing 
the key characteristics of each.
Peirce associates many characteristics with the physicalist term chance, in-
cluding everything from indeterminacy, spontaneity, and freedom, to the kinds 
of accidental variations associated with aesthetic amusements such as sporting 
and ‘games of chance’. It applies generally to occurrences or events that seem 
to be devoid of any reason or regulating ground, but which appear to happen 
in-themselves and of-themselves in a purely non-relational sense (Peirce, 1883-
1884: 222; Peirce, 1886: 243; Peirce, 1887-1888: 289). While occurrences in a 
chance world would be predictable in a general, systematic sense (Peirce, 1878: 
172-176; Peirce, 1883-1884: 222; Peirce, 1892: 310), occurrences within such 
135C.S. Peirce’s Cosmogonic Philosophy of Emergent Evolution...
SCIO. Revista de Filosofía, n.º 12, Noviembre de 2016, 123-142, ISSN: 1887-9853
a world would nevertheless be completely devoid of any regulating or govern-
ing agency (which would work to exclude certain possibilities from occurring) 
(Peirce, 1883-1884: 219). As a natural, physicalist notion, chance is taken as 
basic or base simply because it is first, having no relation to anything before, 
behind, or beyond itself in any physicalist sense.
Where chance is non-relational, law as outlined in the ‘Guess’ is inherently 
relational in a fixed, mechanical, absolute sense. In this absolute sense law rep-
resents a state of hard determinism or where the dyadic relata are what they are 
by way of the fixed, unalterable bond that each has to the other. Law in this fixed, 
mechanical sense is a relation of materialistic force “which produces sequences or 
Seconds” and which is so completely determinate as to make it impossible for it 
to be otherwise than it is (Peirce, 1886: 243-244; 1887-88: 277; Peirce, 1891: 
292; Peirce, 1892: 300). Law in this second, dyadic sense represents a final state 
of necessitarian determination, a world or state where everything would be pre-
dictable precisely and exactly. Thus where chance represents a state of absolute 
indeterminacy, law in the sense outlined in the ‘Guess’ is complete and general-
ized absolute determinacy, a condition that stands maximally opposed to chance 
as its radical difference or other. As a physicalist notion law in this maximally 
determining sense is second precisely because it is what it is by way of its contrast 
with chance.
Where chance and law stand as opposing notions in Peirce’s ‘Guess’, the third 
element of habit taking serves the intermediary function of bringing the oth-
erwise radically opposed elements of chance and law together in a continuous, 
intelligible, reasonable process of evolutionary growth. Thus habit taking stands 
in-between chance and law, each of which stand as a limit of the habit taking 
tendency. As an intermediary third, habit taking thereby has a dual orientation, 
namely, “back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was no law 
but mere indeterminacy” (i.e. a state of absolute chance), and “forward to a point 
in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but 
a complete reign of law” (i.e. a state of absolute law) (Peirce, 1887-1888: 277). 
The essence of the habit taking element is to bring the otherwise disparate ele-
ments of chance and law together in a coherent, reasonable whole (Peirce, 1892a: 
347). This role is consistent with Peirce’s later claim that “Thirdness is that whose 
being consists in its bringing about a secondness” (Peirce, 1903: 267), for the 
habit taking tendency in this natural, evolutionary sense serves as the means 
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of evolving the world towards a generalized, necessitarian state of absolute law 
(which functions as a limit upon the generalizing effect of the habit taking ten-
dency). For unlike the other kinds of possible habit-relating tendencies or thirds, 
the habit taking tendency is a “self-generative” tendency because of its power to 
increase the average strength of its outcomes as a process of acceleration or growth 
(Peirce, 1883-1884: 223; Peirce, 1887-1888: 277-278). As such it will naturally 
be selected for from among the alternative habit relating tendencies as a destined 
outcome of a process of cosmological selection. 
Since the general order of Nature is marked by degrees of uniformity and reg-
ularity in the sense outlined above, then we can safely conclude that “the world 
is not a mere chance medley” (Peirce, 1878: 172). Since a necessitarian world of 
absolute law would not display the kinds of approximation to law that are char-
acteristic of natural phenomena, then we can also safely conclude that the world 
is not necessitarian in character (Peirce, 1892: 303-306). According to Peirce, the 
natural world in which we live is somewhere between these two limits or states, 
and to best account for it we need to posit a third, generalizing principle or ten-
dency that would account for the evolutionary growth within the order of Nature 
from an original chance-world and towards an increasing state of generalized 
conformity to law. It is to this end that Peirce introduces his habit-taking ten-
dency, a tendency which he suggests “has produced all regularities” (Peirce, 1892: 
310). So qualified, Peirce’s cosmogony therefore proceeds something like this:
1. The Categories are introduced as conditions for the possibility of any and 
all phenomena in all their diverse senses (Peirce, 1887-1888: 247-256). As 
conditions of possibility, the Categories function as something akin to qua-
si-transcendental (non-dogmatic) conditions in a Kantian sense or, better yet, 
as conditions for the possibility of phenomena in something akin to Apel’s 
“transcendental-pragmatic” sense (Apel, 2001: 166-177).
2. Peirce identifies the level of uniformity and conformity with law associated 
with the laws of nature as “a highly exceptional phenomenon” that calls for 
explanation; “and since Law in general cannot be explained by any law in par-
ticular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of 
pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy” (Peirce, 1887-1888: 276). Put 
differently, the existence of a general conformity to law cannot be explained 
by any particular law, for that would beg the question of where the particular 
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law came from, so lawfulness must have its roots in something that is not 
itself lawful or law-like in character (where the generalized uniformity associ-
ated with law involves the exclusion of certain logical or chance possibilities).
3. It is here that Peirce appeals to the Categories introduced earlier in the article, 
outlining three physicalist expressions of the Categories, namely, chance, law, 
and habit-taking as the fundamental physicalist constituents or ingredients 
underlying the general order of Nature. Chance of course is first as absolute 
beginning, law in the necessitarian sense is second as absolute end, and hab-
it-taking is third as mediating function (Peirce, 1887-1888: 277).
4. In the earliest stages of cosmogonic evolution the three elements stand in a 
chaotic “state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really hap-
pened,” a state of quasi-existence if you will in which the dyadic and triadic 
elements exist as something akin to mere possibilities. The triadic or habit 
taking principle in particular can be thought of as merely idling as it were in a 
possibility space awaiting its spontaneous emergence to work upon some oth-
er condition that can set it in motion, some ‘input’ upon which it can begin 
to work (in much the same sense in which Locke’s powers of mind or Kant’s 
Categories of the Understanding might be thought to be sitting idling until 
set in motion by sensible experience). This condition marks one of the first 
and most basic ‘tests’ of Peirce’s Categories, for if they are to be truly compre-
hensive and elementary in the sense proposed, then they must be capable of 
starting themselves from themselves without appealing to anything outside of 
themselves in any ad hoc sense as a kind of deus ex machina.
5. It is here that Peirce introduces his famous “flash,” an occurrence that seems 
to appear spontaneously and arbitrarily precisely because it is spontaneous 
and arbitrary, and is justified in being so “by the principle of firstness” (Peirce, 
1887-1888: 278). In keeping with the “principle of firstness” that serves as 
its transcendental or quasi-transcendental ground, the flash manifests as a 
spontaneous, chance occurrence that has no cause or determining condition 
outside of itself. Such a spontaneous occurrence is perfectly consistent with 
a chance world as the First and hence base or default condition of natural 
existence.
6. While the flash manifests “by the principle of firstness,” the flash itself is 
actually an instance of Secondness, for it is second to the state of chaotic in-
determinacy or mere possibility from which it arose. Thus the flash actually 
138 Philip Rose
SCIO. Revista de Filosofía, n.º 12, Noviembre de 2016, 123-142, ISSN: 1887-9853
serves as the beginning of difference or otherness in a determinate sense (which 
thereby comes prior to the unifying function of Thirdness)4. 
7. Once the first flash is set in motion it can serve as a given input for the habit 
taking function which also arises spontaneously by chance (for there is noth-
ing to prevent or exclude its occurrence). “Then by the principle of habit 
there would have been a second flash,” then a third, then a growing multi-
plicity of flashes until we see eventual emergence of a series of such events that 
becomes increasingly “continuous and uniform in its flow,” thereby marking 
the birth of time (Peirce, 1887-1888: 278).
8. By the principle of firstness and secondness we eventually see the emergence 
of pairs of simultaneous events, thereby marking the birth of space (Peirce, 
1887-1888: 278-279). And so on, and so on… 
§6. another guess at the rIddle
I will finish by proposing what T.L. Short and others claim cannot be done. 
According to Short, Peirce’s cosmology was doomed to fail because “it proposed 
to derive Thirdness from Secondness or, possibly, from Firstness. If the phaner-
oscopy is sound, then this is absurd. Laws cannot be reduced to nor derived from 
anything of lesser category” (Short, 2010: 535). Carrying the call to explanation 
to its utmost limits (or at least as far as I am able to bring them), I want to sug-
gest that it is not just the laws of nature that call for explanation, but the very 
existence of Thirdness and Secondness as such. Put simply I will suggest a way of 
explaining how Secondness and Thirdness might have come to be, not as seconds 
or thirds, as Peirce suggests in his cosmology, but as Categories per se5. 
While I agree with Short and others that the Categories cannot be reduced 
to one other, it does not follow that some cannot be derived from another. It 
4 I add this qualifying note as a nod to those who may claim that difference must precede unity, 
for since the aim at unity is a function of Thirdness on this account (which comes after Secondness 
or difference) then it should be clear that Peirce’s account is perfectly compatible with that position.
5 I should note that I believe the account of Peirce evolutionary cosmogony outlined here also 
addresses most if not all of the objections raised in Short (2010). I hope to provide a more detailed 
outline of this in a future work.
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is clear that if the Categories are to stand as non-reducible elements in Peirce’s 
sense of the term, then each must bring something to the table that the others, 
including any combination of the others, cannot. I accept this point. But if we 
take the term ‘derive’ in the spirit of Peirce’s semio-illative account of inference, 
as a logical process of following-from that is inherently ampliative, ecstatic, and 
emergentist in character (Rose, 2011a), then it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the very Categories of Secondness and Thirdness could stand as emergent out-
comes of Firstness. Here is a brief sketch of Peirce’s basic cosmogonic scheme, 
but now modified and applied to the Metaphysical question of how the Catego-
ries could have come to be. I suggest that by extending Peirce’s basic cosmogonic 
argument in the metaphysical sense outlined here we can see how the Categories 
of Secondness and Thirdness can be said to have come into being as emergent 
conditions that follow from but are not reducible to Firstness as their ground.
1. In the beginning was Firstness. Expressed in modal terms, this would be a 
state of absolute possibility, a state where there was nothing actual or poten-
tial, no limit or limiting power whatsoever, just a state of absolute, indeter-
minate possibility. As a state of radical indeterminacy, Firstness can neither 
be determinate nor determining, for this would be to presume some limit or 
limiting power. But there is no limit or limiting power of any sort, there is 
quite literally Nothing, or at least as close to Nothing as we may be able to 
conceive (i.e. no-thing, no activity or power of determination, no orientation 
–Nothing). As a state entirely devoid of limit or limiting power, Firstness 
must be maximally determinable, for if it were not then this would imply a 
power of exclusion, prohibition or limit of some sort, and such a state is the 
absence of such things. Because there is no limit of any sort, only a state of 
maximal determinability, Firstness stands as a state of absolute permissibility, a 
condition where quite literally anything is possible, including the impossible 
as such (at least as defined by the principle of non-contradiction).
2. From this state of absolute permissibility there emerges Secondness, not as 
something determined by Firstness, but as something that is permitted or made 
possible by Firstness as such. Secondness stands as limit, difference, otherness, 
the negation of Firstness that is not itself reducible to Firstness, but stands 
alongside of it as a new, irreducible element of being.
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3. From Firstness and Secondness there again emerges Thirdness, not as some-
thing determined by Firstness or Secondess, but as something that is not 
prohibited by either. Thirdness stands as a mediating condition that serves 
to bring together or unify the otherwise disparate elements of Firstness and 
Secondness into a coherent, continuous unity or whole. Secondness and First-
ness will be ingredient within Thirdness, but it will not be reducible to either, 
standing as a newly emergent, irreducible element of being alongside Firstness 
and Secondness.
Here we have a very brief sketch of the origins of the Categories of Secondness 
and Thirdness. Since existence and actuality are conditions of Secondness and 
Thirdness, then this account can be thought of as the derivation of something 
from nothing. Whether this is a clarification of Peirce’s work or an amendment 
to it is a matter of discussion. Certainly the seeds of the idea are already present 
in Peirce’s work and it is clear that he toyed with something like this as well. We 
see hints of it, for example, in Peirce’s claim that “the tendency to growth can be 
supposed itself to have grown from an infinitesimal germ accidentally started” 
(Peirce, 1891: 289). We also see hints of it in Peirces later claim that at least two 
of the three Universes “have a creator independent of them” (Peirce, 1908: 449), 
with Firstness as presented here standing as the ground or ‘creator’ of the other 
two. If this account seems reasonable at all (and I think it does), it is because it 
is expressive of the same kinds of emergent, ampliative, ecstatic elements found 
within Peirce’s semio-illative account of logic and inference. Insofar as Second-
ness and Thirdness follow from Firstness, such following is not a relation of 
determination but of destination, for they are destined though not determined.
§7. conclusIon
Peirce’s cosmogony philosophy of emergent evolution stands as a radical 
and potentially rich alternative to other works in the emergentist tradition. Not 
only does he reject the mechanistic metaphysics that seems to underlie so many 
emergentist accounts, but his inclusion of chance (Firstness) and a principle of 
growth (Thirdness) as real ingredients in the world also goes a long way towards 
accounting for the general fact of emergence as such, as a predictable, explicable 
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feature of the general order of Nature. In effect what we have here is a plausible 
hypothesis for a theory of emergence, one that is sorely lacking within the emer-
gentist literature. I believe it is time for scholars and others who are interested in 
rethinking our conception of Nature to begin looking more seriously at Peirce’s 
work in order to finally give it the attention and respect it is due.
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